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Abstract
Embedded control programs are hard to analyse because
their behaviour depends on how they interact with hard-
ware devices. In particular, embedded code typically uses
interrupts to respond to external events in a timely man-
ner. Such asynchronous control constructs make static anal-
ysis difficult due to the potentially large number of alter-
native control-flow paths they allow. We show how model
checking can be used to effectively analyse the behaviour
of interrupt-dependent programs. This is done by develop-
ing an abstraction of the code that captures its essential
timing and functional properties, including those related to
external interrupts. The model is made efficient by grouping
program instructions into basic blocks whose behaviour is
atomic with respect to interrupts.
1 Introduction
Embedded control programs present significant develop-
ment and maintenance problems. For efficiency they are of-
ten written in low-level languages, which makes them hard
to understand. Also, since they interact directly with their
hardware environment, they are difficult to analyse in isola-
tion. Moreover, many such systems are safety critical due to
the influence they may exert on their physical environment.
A particular problem is that embedded programs typ-
ically use interrupts to schedule periodic activities or to
respond to external events in a timely manner. Such
asynchronous control constructs make understanding and
analysing the code very challenging, due to the potentially
large number of alternative run-time instruction sequences
they allow.
Motivated by the challenge of understanding and main-
taining legacy avionics code, we show how model checking
can be used to effectively analyse an interrupt-dependent
control program. This is done by modelling the effect of in-
structions as transitions on the state of the processor’s hard-
ware and that of significant hardware devices. The passage
of time itself is also modelled as a state property. The guards
that determine when transitions may occur are constructed
in a way that allows state-triggered and interrupt-triggered
actions to co-exist, with priority given to interrupt actions.
Finally, to make the model acceptably efficient, we group
instructions into single-entry point, single-exit point basic
blocks, provided that the resulting compound actions can
be considered atomic with respect to interrupts.
2 Previous Work
The notion of applying model checking to embedded
control systems is by no means new. For instance, the SMV
model checker was used previously to analyse an abstrac-
tion of a medical monitoring system [6]. As in our ap-
proach, explicit timestamp variables were used to define
when time-dependent events could occur. Unlike our work,
however, the Petri net model used as a starting point was not
directly related to embedded program code.
Similarly, the SPIN model checker has been applied suc-
cessfully to a chemical plant controller [4]. Again, the timed
automata-based model was derived from a hardware de-
scription rather than program code. In this case the main
technical challenge was to develop a discrete approximation
of the plant’s continuous behaviour. To improve the model’s
efficiency, care was taken to model only those points in time
at which significant events occur. We use a similar idea be-
low to avoid generating too many alternative, but essentially
equivalent, interrupt behaviours.
More recent, and much closer to our motivation, was
application of the LTSA model checker to avionics soft-
ware [13]. In this case the focus was on component-based
software, using a publish/subscribe interaction paradigm.
This differs from our interest in legacy programs written in
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the cyclic-executive multi-tasking style. Notably, the result-
ing LTSA model treated communication as synchronous,
rather than asynchronous.
Closest of all to our research was the development of a
model checking tool for software running on the Z86 pro-
cessor [5]. As in our work, the emphasis was on interrupt-
dependent programs written in assembly code. Unlike our
work, however, the goal was to use model checking to en-
sure that the interrupt mechanism itself was being used cor-
rectly, where we are more concerned with the overall prop-
erties of programs that rely on interrupts. The approach
used was to model the behaviours of the Interrupt Mask
Register, Program Counter and stack for this particular ma-
chine in their entirety. The results were impressive, but this
approach is much more detailed than we need. For our pur-
poses we are interested in modelling just enough of the in-
terrupt mechanism to be able to make useful predictions
about the system’s dynamic behaviour. As demonstrated
below, we have found that we can achieve practical results
with a comparatively abstract representation of the relation-
ship between the Program Counter and the times at which
external interrupts occur.
3 Background: Embedded Control Systems
Our research is motivated by the problem of maintain-
ing legacy embedded programs in avionics applications. A
typical avionics Mission Computer System consists of sev-
eral Remote Terminals connected by a central data bus [14].
Each Remote Terminal contains a Central Processing Unit
(CPU) and a separate Input-Output Processor (IOP) as
shown in Figure 1 [9].
Each Remote Terminal’s CPU performs a particular air-
craft function (e.g., navigation, displaying cockpit data, de-
ploying weapons, etc), while the IOP provides an interface
to other Remote Terminals and peripheral devices in the air-
craft. Having a dedicated IOP allows the CPU to execute
without having to wait for bus access or for peripheral de-
vices to respond.
The CPU and IOP exchange data via a shared Memory
Module. To send data from the Remote Terminal to an-
other terminal or peripheral device, the CPU stores the data
in shared memory and instructs the IOP to forward it to the
appropriate destination. The CPU can then continue execut-
ing while the IOP completes the output operation. To read
data from another Remote Terminal or peripheral device,
the CPU instructs the IOP to read data from the appropri-
ate source. Then, while the CPU continues executing, the
IOP interfaces with the bus or device and places the data
received in the shared memory. Once this is done the IOP
generates an I/O Completion Interrupt that tells the CPU the
input operation has been completed [9].
The software on the CPU typically consists of a set of
periodic tasks (processes) controlled by a central Mission
Computer Executive which invokes each task at a predeter-
mined frequency [9].
4 Motivational Example
As a simple example of interrupt-dependent code, con-
sider the Altitude Display task in Figure 2. This is intended
to be one of the tasks periodically invoked on the Display
Processor Remote Terminal [14] when the aircraft is cruis-
ing at high altitude. The task’s purpose is to send the air-
craft’s current altitude to the Head-Up Display (HUD) in
the cockpit.
At each invocation the task asks for an altitude reading
from the aircraft’s Radar Altimeter Remote Terminal [14].
While waiting for a response the task estimates the aircraft’s
altitude by extrapolating from the most recent altitudes dis-
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Label Operation Operands Comment
isr: MOV $TRUE, %R3 Set I/O ready flag
RETURN Resume interrupted task
...
startio: MOV $FALSE, %R3 Reset I/O ready flag
MOV $GETALT, %R0 Value that tells the IOP to get an altitude reading
STORE %R0, (toiop) Send instruction to IOP
calcalt: LOAD (penalt), %R0 Get penultimate altitude (stored by previous task invocation)
LOAD (prevalt), %R1 Get previous altitude (stored by previous task invocation)
STORE %R1, (penalt) Store penultimate altitude for the next invocation of this task
MOV %R1, %R2 Copy previous altitude into register 2
SUB %R0, %R1 Set register 1 to the difference between the last two altitudes
ADD %R1, %R2 Set register 2 to the calculated altitude
display: BRFALSE %R3, send Skip next instruction if no interrupt has occurred yet
LOAD (fromiop), %R2 Get altitude reading from IOP
send: STORE %R2, (tohud) Send altitude to Head-Up Display
STORE %R2, (prevalt) Store previous altitude for the next invocation of this task
Figure 2. Assembly program for the Altitude Display task
played. If the altimeter has responded by the time this calcu-
lation is complete the altimeter reading is sent to the HUD.
Otherwise the estimated altitude is used. The attempt to get
the altitude from the altimeter may fail either due to con-
tention for the central data bus or problems with the altime-
ter itself. Most importantly for our purposes, an I/O Com-
pletion Interrupt is used to the tell the Altitude Display task
when an altimeter reading has been received.
The program in Figure 2 uses a simple two-address in-
struction set. The program listing is presented in AT&T-
style assembly language: registers are prefixed by ‘%’; im-
mediate values by ‘$’; and direct memory addresses appear
in parentheses. For clarity we use symbolic names for con-
stants, including address-valued constants.
The two instructions at label isr in Figure 2 form the
Altitude Display task’s Interrupt Service Routine. It sets
register 3 to logical ‘true’ to indicate that an interrupt has
occurred. (More generally, it could also indicate what
class of interrupt it was [9].) Not visible in the code is
the hardware-implemented action which stores the current
Program Counter value and transfers control to label isr
whenever an interrupt occurs. The RETURN instruction sub-
sequently restores the Program Counter and thus transfers
control back to the point of the interrupt.
The body of the task is assumed to be invoked period-
ically by the Mission Computer Executive and begins at
label startio. Its first actions are to set register 3 to
‘false’ and then instruct the Input-Output Processor to get
an altitude reading from the Radar Altimeter. This is done
by putting constant GETALT into memory-mapped register
toiop, which is assumed here to be used by the CPU to
send input/output requests to the IOP.
The six instructions beginning at label calcalt then
perform a dead-reckoning altitude calculation, while wait-
ing for the altimeter to respond. Memory locations
prevalt and penalt contain the previous and penulti-
mate displayed altitudes, respectively, stored by the Altitude
Display task’s previous invocation. The difference between
these two altitudes is added to the previous altitude to pro-
duce the estimated altitude for the current invocation.
The four instructions beginning at label display then
check whether or not the Radar Altimeter has responded
yet. If so, the measured altitude is read from shared-
memory location fromiop and sent to the cockpit Head-
Up Display via memory-mapped register tohud. If not, the
dead-reckoning result is sent to the HUD instead. Control
then returns to the central scheduler (not shown).
At first glance the overall strategy embodied by this Al-
titude Display task seems reasonable. At each invocation
it displays either the actual measured altitude or an extrap-
olation based on the last two altitudes displayed. It would
appear that only an unbroken sequence of I/O request over-
runs could cause the displayed altitude to vary markedly
from the actual one. However, as we shall see, our model
of this interrupt-dependent task will reveal a serious flaw in
the code’s dynamic behaviour.
5 Analysing Interrupt-Dependent Code
In essence, model checkers perform an exhaustive state-
space search of a state-transition system in an attempt to
find a counterexample which refutes a claimed property
of the model. To make model checking of an interrupt-
dependent program practical, we are therefore obliged to
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develop an abstraction of the program which captures all
of its important characteristics. However, the overall state
space and number of transitions must be kept as small as
possible since model checking is notorious for the explo-
sive growth of memory and time it requires for non-trivial
examples.
Our approach begins with a pragmatic combination of
features from previous formal models of time-sensitive, re-
active systems. Significant aspects of the embedded com-
puter’s state, such as the contents of registers and sig-
nificant memory locations, are represented as state vari-
ables [10]. A ‘current time’ variable Now is introduced to
model the passage of time [1]. A Program Counter vari-
able PC is introduced to explicitly control sequencing of
instructions [3]. The behaviour of each instruction in the
program is represented as a non-deterministic multiple as-
signment to the system state [11]. Basic blocks of instruc-
tions, i.e., groups of consecutive instructions with a single
entry and exit point [2], are modelled as single transitions.
Auxiliary timestamp variables [1] are added to the model
to keep track of the times at which interrupts will occur.
The Boolean guards that determine when actions may occur
take the state of the Program Counter, the current time and
the interrupt timestamps into account [1, 11]. In particular,
our handling of guards and the grouping of instructions into
blocks is central to our ability to effectively and efficiently
model interrupt-dependent code.
For each class of interrupt that may occur our model
maintains a timestamp variable that defines when the next
such interrupt will occur. If the interrupt is currently dis-
abled or otherwise not expected, this time is set to infinity.
Although the sequencing of instructions in an assembly
program is primarily governed by the Program Counter, in-
terrupts effectively ‘hijack’ this flow of control. Therefore,
we guard each action performed during the program’s ‘nor-
mal’ flow of control with not only the condition that the
Program Counter points to the appropriate location, but also
that the current time is earlier than all anticipated interrupts,
as defined by their timestamps. Conversely, any action that
models an interrupt handler is guarded by the condition that
the current time equals or is later than the corresponding
timestamp. Expressing the guards in this form gives prior-
ity to interrupt actions over ‘normal’ ones.
The most important aspect of our approach is the way
we group instructions into basic blocks. Modelling every
instruction as a distinct transition, to allow for the possibil-
ity that an interrupt occurs during that instruction, would be
hopelessly inefficient. Instead we allow basic blocks to be
modelled as if they are atomic, even if there is a possibility
that an interrupt could occur mid-way through the block,
provided that there is no observable difference between the
interrupt occuring during the block or immediately after-
wards. This is so if the Interrupt Service Routine only as-
signs to variables that are not accessed by the block. Indeed,
good programming style normally dictates that ISRs should
be kept short and do little more than set flags, so this is fre-
quently the case.
However, the occurrence of an interrupt during a basic
block of instructions will always have an impact on the
block’s end-to-end execution time. Therefore, we also re-
quire that the absolute timing of any ‘outputs’ from the
block cannot have any significant impact on any other part
of the system. This is usually the case in multi-tasking con-
trol programs anyway. Typically, such programs are cali-
brated so that only the absolute starting and finishing time
of whole task invocations is important, not the timing of
actions within an invocation [12].
Thus, even though an interrupt may occur during a ba-
sic block in practice, our model still treats the block as
atomic and defers the corresponding Interrupt Service Rou-
tine action until after the block has finished, provided the
above conditions are satisfied. This is similar to the no-
tion of ‘serialisability’ of concurrent updates for distributed
databases—as long as no observer can see the difference,
‘concurrent’ actions can be modelled as if they occur in se-
quence [15].
Of course, this strategy must be applied with care. Nev-
ertheless, informed by an understanding of the program’s
intended behaviour, and its execution environment, it is usu-
ally not difficult to tell which interrupts are enabled during
a particular block and whether or not their occurrence can
directly influence the block’s (functional) behaviour. More-
over, given common idioms of interrupt usage, the analysis
and translation described above should be readily automat-
able.
6 Case Study
To demonstrate this approach we used the Sym-
bolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL), a collection of tools
based around an expressive language for describing state-
transition systems [8]. In particular, SAL’s Bounded Model
Checker searches the state space of a model to try to find
a counterexample which refutes a given temporal logic for-
mula [7].
The interrupt-dependent program from Figure 2 was
modelled in the SAL language as shown in Figure 3. A
state-transition system is constructed in SAL from named,
guarded actions, written ‘name: guard → action’. The
guard is a predicate on the system state and any action with
a ‘true’ guard may be performed. Each action comprises
one or more assignments, composed simultaneously. Here
we use operator ‘||’ to indicate simultaneous composition.
Assignment of an expression E’s value to a variable v is
written here as v := E, and assignment of a value chosen
nondeterministically from a set S is denoted v :∈ S.
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Our model of the Altitude Display task consists of six
actions. Action InterruptServiceRoutine models the ef-
InterruptServiceRoutine:
Now ≥ NextInterrupt →
Reg3 := true ||
MemFromIOP := · · · ||
Now := Now + (3 ∗ InstrExTime) ||
NextInterrupt :=∞
StartIOSuccess:
PC = StartIO ∧ Now < NextInterrupt →
Reg3 := false ||
Now := Now + (3 ∗ InstrExTime) ||
NextInterrupt :∈
{t : Time | Now + (7 ∗ InstrExTime) ≤ t ≤
Now + (9 ∗ InstrExTime)} ||
PC := CalcAlt
StartIOOverrun:
PC = StartIO ∧ Now < NextInterrupt →
Reg3 := false ||
Now := Now + (3 ∗ InstrExTime) ||
NextInterrupt :∈
{t : Time | Now + (9 ∗ InstrExTime) < t ≤
Now + (12 ∗ InstrExTime)} ||
PC := CalcAlt
DeadReckoningCalculation:
PC = CalcAlt ∧ Now < NextInterrupt →
Reg0 := MemPenAlt ||
Reg1 := MemPrevAlt−MemPenAlt ||
Reg2 := MemPrevAlt +
(MemPrevAlt−MemPenAlt) ||
MemPenAlt := MemPrevAlt ||
Now := Now + (6 ∗ InstrExTime) ||
PC := Display
DisplayMeasuredAltitude:
PC = Display ∧ Now < NextInterrupt ∧
Reg3 = true →
Reg2 := MemFromIOP ||
MemToHUD := MemFromIOP ||
MemPrevAlt := MemFromIOP ||
Now := Now + (4 ∗ InstrExTime) ||
PC := · · ·
DisplayCalculatedAltitude:
PC = Display ∧ Now < NextInterrupt ∧
Reg3 = false →
MemToHUD := Reg2 ||
MemPrevAlt := Reg2 ||
Now := Now + (3 ∗ InstrExTime) ||
PC := · · ·
Figure 3. State-transition model of the Alti-
tude Display task
fect of the two instructions at label isr in Figure 2 (with
the interrupt generated by the IOP assumed to consume
one instruction cycle). Actions StartIOSuccess and Start-
IOOverrun together model the three instructions at label
startio for the cases where the altimeter will and will
not respond in time, respectively. Action DeadReckoning-
Calculation corresponds to the six instructions starting at
label calcalt. Finally, actions DisplayMeasuredAltitude
and DisplayCalculatedAltitude model the four instructions
at label display in the situation where the altimeter does
and does not respond in time, respectively. (Modelling each
of the conditional ‘start I/O’ and ‘display’ actions as two
separate transitions, with distinct names, makes the traces
produced by the model checker easier to read.)
Other parts of the model, not shown in Figure 3, include:
type and constant declarations; variable initialisations; an
action which models the way the Mission Computer Execu-
tive invokes the Altitude Display task periodically; and the
model of the aircraft’s dynamic flight characteristics (dis-
cussed further in Section 7).
Some features of the program translate directly into the
model. These include memory addresses (e.g., address
startio in Figure 2 becomes constant StartIO in Fig-
ure 3), general-purpose registers (e.g., register R2’s con-
tents are modelled by variable Reg2), and values in memory
locations (e.g., the contents of memory location prevalt
are modelled by variable MemPrevAlt).
Other features of the model are implicit in the code. No-
tably, the Program Counter is modelled by variable PC, the
instruction cycle time is represented as constant InstrEx-
Time, and the current absolute time is modelled by variable
Now.
The model also contains significant features of the hard-
ware environment. Most importantly, the time at which
the next I/O Completion Interrupt will occur is modelled
by variable NextInterrupt, and the way the aircraft’s alti-
tude changes between task invocations is modelled by the
values assigned to variable MemFromIOP (this calculation
is not shown in Figure 3). Timestamp NextInterrupt is
set to infinity by action InterruptServiceRoutine to indicate
that no further interrupts are expected following this action.
Conversely, the interrupt from the IOP is enabled by ac-
tions StartIOSuccess and StartIOOverrun, since these ac-
tions model the request sent to the IOP that initiates that
chain of events leading to an interrupt.
Curiously, whether or not the interrupt arrives in time or
overruns is predetermined in the model. Action StartIO-
Success chooses a value for timestamp NextInterrupt that
guarantees the IOP will respond in time, whereas action
StartIOOverrun’s occurrence always results in the IOP fail-
ing to respond before the dead reckoning calculation is com-
pleted. (In Figure 3 the range of times within which the I/O
Completion Interrupt may occur is expressed in terms of the
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Figure 4. Counterexample produced by the model checker showing an anticipated failure mode
number of instructions executed, starting from the one at la-
bel startio, inclusive.) Thus the model checker’s choice
between these two actions determines which of the two
actions DisplayMeasuredAltitude and DisplayCalculated-
Altitude will occur subsequently.
The Boolean guards on each action take the relation-
ship between transitions that are enabled by the Program
Counter’s value and by the occurrence of asynchronous
interrupts into account. Each ‘normal’ action is guarded
by the requirement that PC equals the corresponding code
block’s starting address and that the current time Now is
earlier than any forthcoming interrupt. Conversely, action
InterruptServiceRoutine will occur whenever Now equals
or exceeds NextInterrupt. This means that action Interrupt-
ServiceRoutine will always occur as soon as possible.
Most importantly, we need to ensure that our grouping
of instruction sequences into atomic actions accurately pre-
serves the program’s behaviour with respect to interrupts.
Actions StartIOSuccess and StartIOOverrun can be treated
as atomic because they occur before the I/O Completion In-
terrupt is enabled. Action DisplayMeasuredAltitude can be
treated as atomic because it is performed only after the in-
terrupt has arrived.
However, if the interrupt arrives in time it may occur
while the sequence of six instructions at label calcalt in
Figure 2 is executing. (The timestamp assigned to variable
NextInterrupt in action StartIOSuccess ensures this in the
model.) Nevertheless, these six instructions can be mod-
elled as the atomic action DeadReckoningCalculation in
Figure 3 because none of the variables Reg3, MemFromIOP
and NextInterrupt set by action InterruptServiceRoutine are
accessed by the assignments in DeadReckoningCalculation.
Thus it does not matter whether the Interrupt Service Rou-
tine is modelled as occurring during or immediately after
this block of instructions.
However, this is not true of the current time variable
Now, which is both set and accessed by all actions. There-
fore, we must also be sure that the absolute timing of events
within action DeadReckoningCalculation is not significant
for any other part of the system. The only variables assigned
by this action are registers, whose values are meaningful
only to this invocation of the Altitude Display task, and the
value in memory location penalt, which will not be ac-
cessed again until the next invocation of this task. Thus,
we can safely assume that the absolute times at which these
variables are set is not significant. (We assume that no other
task reads from location penalt. Even if one did, it could
not make reliable use of the specific time at which the Alti-
tude Display task writes to the location.)
Similarly, if the I/O Completion Interrupt arrives too late
(as defined by action StartIOOverrun) it will occur during
action DisplayCalculatedAltitude. Again, none of the as-
signments in this action relies on variables set by the Inter-
rupt Service Routine (other than Now).
However, action DisplayCalculatedAltitude assigns to
memory location tohud which we assume is observable
externally, so we must also consider the potential effect of
the Interrupt Service Routine executing before versus af-
ter this externally observable event. As mentioned above,
a real-time task set is usually designed in such a way that
‘intra-task’ event timing is insignificant compared to the
overall schedule of whole task invocations [12]. Therefore,
provided that the instruction cycle time is much smaller than
the Altitude Display task’s period, we can safely treat action
DisplayCalculatedAltitude as atomic.
7 Practical Results
To confirm the accuracy of our approach we used SAL’s
model checker and the model in Figure 3 to analyse the dy-
namic behaviour of the program in Figure 2. Our aim was to
test the claim that the displayed altitude always stays within
5 metres of the actual altitude (as measured by the radar
altimeter).
The model of the aircraft’s dynamic behaviour (not
shown in Figure 3) was calibrated on the assumptions that:
the aircraft is in ‘cruise mode’ at an altitude between 9,000
and 10,000 metres; the Altitude Display task is invoked with
a frequency of 10Hz; the CPU’s instruction cycle time is
5 microseconds; the aircraft’s maximum vertical velocity is
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Figure 5. Counterexample produced by the model checker showing an unexpected failure mode
360km/hr; and its maximum vertical acceleration is 10m/s2.
Given the constraint on the aircraft’s vertical accelera-
tion, we guessed that it would require three consecutive I/O
request overruns for the displayed altitude to vary by 5 me-
tres from the measured one. Indeed, when we allowed I/O
overruns to occur without bound, the model checker pro-
duced a counterexample that exactly confirmed our intu-
itions as shown in Figure 4. In this trace the I/O Completion
Interrupt arrives too late in the task cycles ending at times
0.7, 0.8 and 0.9 seconds. Since the aircraft begins descend-
ing during this interval, following a period of level flight,
the extrapolated altitude diverges from the actual one un-
til they differ by 6 metres in the cycle beginning at time
0.9 seconds.
We then placed a limit on the number of consecutive I/O
request overruns allowed by the model, expecting that this
would ensure the displayed altitude remains acceptably ac-
curate. To our surprise, however, the model checker pro-
duced the counterexample shown in Figure 5, where I/O
overruns occur in the cycles ending at times 0.2, 0.4, 05, 0.7
and 0.9 seconds. Even though there are no long sequences
of consecutive overruns, and the aircraft’s vertical velocity
is almost constant, the displayed altitude still goes out of
range!
This unanticipated behaviour is due to the displayed alti-
tude’s ability to oscillate around the actual (measured) alti-
tude with increasingly large errors. The aircraft accelerates
upwards in the cycle ending at simulation time 0.2 seconds
which causes the task to underestimate the altitude slightly.
The aircraft then accelerates downwards in the cycles end-
ing at times 0.4 and 0.5 seconds, which causes the task to
overcompensate in the other direction, and so on. Thus a
sequence of (gentle) vertical accelerations, coupled with si-
multaneous I/O request overruns, allows the absolute differ-
ence between the actual and displayed altitudes to grow over
time: −1 metre at simulation time 0.2 seconds, +4 metres
at 0.5 seconds,−5 metres at 0.7 seconds and finally +6 me-
tres at time 0.9 seconds.
This example thus not only confirmed the accuracy of
our approach to modelling interrupts, but also revealed that
the program code in Figure 2—although seemingly cor-
rect on first inspection—has an unacceptable dynamic be-
haviour. (The inherent instability of this type of process is
well-known in control theory, of course. We can compen-
sate for it by basing the extrapolation on several preceding
altitudes, not just the last two.)
8 Conclusion
Embedded control programs typically use interrupts to
achieve real-time responsiveness, but asynchronous control
constructs make program analysis difficult. Motivated by
the need to understand and maintain legacy control systems,
which may be safety critical, we have illustrated a practi-
cal technique for model checking interrupt-dependent pro-
grams. This was done by carefully modelling the relation-
ship between state-triggered and interrupt-triggered transi-
tions, and by considering the atomicity of instruction se-
quences with respect to interrupts. As shown by the case
study above, the approach is accurate enough to reveal sub-
tle aspects of a control program’s dynamic behaviour. In
future work we will explore further abstraction techniques
needed to make larger examples acceptably efficient, in-
cluding multi-task examples.
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